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Crew coordination error has been identified by the Naval Safety Center
as the number one cause of Naval Aviation mishaps. To address the problem
of crew coordination all Fleet Replacement Squadrons were directed to
implement a training program for all Naval Aircraft. Patrol Squadron Thirty-
One was tasked to implement crew coordination training for P-3 fleet
replacement students and for fleet squadrons. A one day seminar was
developed and implemented for Moffett Field and Barbers Point P-3
squadrons. To measure the effect of crew coordination training the Cockpit
Management Attitudes Questionnaire was administered to crewmembers
prior to and after the seminar. Based on the results of the questionnaire,
attitudes that lead to effective crew coordination are enhanced by the seminar.
Utilizing t-tests of before and after questionnaire responses, significant
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I. AIRCREW COORDINATION TRAINING
A. STATEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this report is to measure attitudinal change resulting from
aircrew coordination training. Attitudinal change is necessary for the
ultimate goal of this training program to be achieved. A training program
with concepts and theories adequate to cause attitude change, should result
in behavior change because attitudes and behavior are assumed to be linked
(Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, Russini, 1986). Behavior more conducive to
safe operation of aircraft is the ultimate goal of Aircrew Coordination
Training.
This thesis examines the attitude changes occurring in P-3 Orion aircrew
personnel who have attended training administered by Patrol Squadron
Thirty-One. The Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (Helmreich,
Wilhelm, and Gregorich, 1988) was administered to seminar participants
prior to and immediately after completion of training. Changes in the
responses of survey participants may be indicative of changes in attitudes
caused by training (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, Russini, 1986). The
consistency and magnitude of changes may provide patterns of change
indicative of aircrew coordination training effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
This report will attempt to identify and explain the significance of survey
response changes.
B. BACKGROUND
1. Aircrew Coordination Training Origins
There has always been an inherent element of risk associated with
the flight of aircraft. As advancements in flight operations have occurred, the
element of risk has been sufficiently reduced to make aircraft operations
practical for a multitude of purposes. Significant improvements in aircraft
design, air traffic control and weather forecasting have reduced the danger of
flight operations.
Significant events in the development of crew coordination training
are detailed by Manningham (1986) starting with events during the early
1970s. The term "pilot error" was an often used description applied to explain
many mishaps. Researchers at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration conducted interviews and observed the performance of crews
to further understand the cause of "pilot error." Investigations into the 1972
crash of an airliner into the Florida everglades, a 1985 crash of a Lockheed
Electra soon after takeoff in Nevada and other mishaps identified the failures
resulting from poor crew coordination. The severity and complexity of crew
coordination error was recognized by the National Transportation and Safety
board and the Federal Aviation Administration. The need for a new
approach to crew training was identified. To meet this need individuals from
all sectors of aviation have sought to understand crew coordination error.
The results of approximately fifteen years of research have been the
development of crew coordination training programs that are now a part of
almost every aviation training program.
Human factors research has determined that pilot experience, age and
time of day are three important variables in aviation safety. Research has
identified the "Most Dangerous Pilot" (Borowsky 1990) as one who has only
five hundred hours or less experience in the assigned aircraft and less than
one thousand hours total. A newly qualified P-3 aircraft commander in many
cases fits this description, and is supported by second and third pilots who
have even less experience. As pilots age they become less likely to make the
skill errors common to junior pilots but become more likely to make
procedural errors. Familiarity tends to cause complacency in more senior
Navy pilots. Further, a dramatic increase in the number of mishaps per
100,000 flight hours occurs as pilots fly during the 1800-2400 hour time frame.
During night time hours, the mishap rate increases from 2 to 4.2 mishaps per
100,000 flight hours(Borowsky, 1990). Inexperience, age and time of day are
important and known tendencies.
There is yet another human factor that is more significant than
inexperience, age or time of day. At present, the most significant causal factor
in aviation mishaps is crew coordination error. Aircrew error accounted for
55 percent of the overall Navy/Marine mishap rate during the years 1985
through 1990 (Borowsky, 1990). The cost of aircrew error during this time was
245 invaluable lives and 187 aircraft worth 1.7 billion dollars (Borowsky,
1990) 1 .
1 Written permission from the Commander Naval Safety Center was obtained to allow
utilization of Naval Aviation mishap data.
The need for extensively trained personnel to operate aircraft is
recognized by civilian and military aviation authorities. Training programs
to date have emphasized thorough knowledge of aircraft systems, and flight
procedures. However, reconstruction of past aviation mishaps has identified
human failures not addressed by traditional training programs. Fully
qualified and extensively trained personnel have become involved in
mishaps due to human error. The nature of this other category of human
error has been identified and is the target of new training programs in
civilian and military aviation. The field of study supporting the research and
training is widely known as Cockpit Resources Management. Recognizing
the important role of crewmembers other than cockpit personnel, the Navy
has entitled its program Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT).
2. Aircrew Coordination Training Development
Interest in ACT research and training has developed because human
error is the most significant cause of aviation mishaps. The type of errors that
are the focus of ACT include errors of decision-making, judgment, and
communications [Cooper, White, Lauber, 1980]. Analysis of cockpit simulator
training demonstrates that crews who more effectively utilize crew
coordination concepts, are more successful when coping with in-flight
emergencies [Foushee and Manos, 1981]. Dr. John K. Lauber of the National
transportation Safety Board defines ACT as:
The effective utilization of all available resources—hardware, software, and
liveware—to achieve safe, efficient flight operations (Lauber, 1986).
Organizations currently devoting resources to ACT research and
implementation include the Federal Aviation Administration, National
Aviation and Space Administration, National Transportation Safety Board,
commercial airlines, military aviation and universities. Improvements in
crew coordination are the focus of so many groups because of the necessity for
improvement.
ACT Training programs vary widely in content and method of
implementation. Significant research into ACT has produced a theoretical
base too large for a single program to cover. ACT training programs must
choose the most appropriate material considering resources available to
implement a program and the mission of the aircraft. A resource intensive
method of implementation includes the use of flight simulators. Via
observation of simulator events the practicality and need for ACT was first
demonstrated. Simulator training is highly useful for decision-making,
communication and coordination training [Foushee and Manos 1981]. The
alternative to simulator training is classroom instruction. The P-3 ACT
course utilizes classroom instruction combined with role play exercises to
demonstrate ACT concepts. Future P-3 ACT courses may incorporate the
utilization of simulators if the resource is made available.
3. The Aircraft
The Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft has been utilized by aircrews of the
United States Navy since 1962 for maritime patrol operations (Figure 1.1).
The primary mission of the aircraft is anti-submarine warfare. Squadrons of
P-3 aircraft are deployed throughout the world on a continuous basis,
monitoring maritime activities of other nations. The aircraft is capable of
transoceanic flights in excess of fifteen hours (P-3C Flight Manual, 1983). The
current version of the aircraft is operated by a crew of twelve including: three
pilots, two flight engineers, two acoustic equipment operators, a tactical
coordinator, navigator, radar operator, in-flight technician and
ordnanceman. The twelve members form a combat air crew. To allow
improved teamwork and efficiency, combat aircrews conduct all training and
operational missions as an intact twelve-member group. The crew is
responsible for operation of an extensive variety of electronics equipment
designed to allow detection, tracking and attack of submarines and ships. The
aircraft is capable of carrying mines, torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and gravity
bombs to carry out wartime missions.
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Figure 1.1. United States Navy P-3C Orion
4. P-3 Orion Mishap History
The P-3 Orion began operation in the U.S. Navy fleet in 1962. Since
that time forward deployed squadrons have been patrolling the waters of the
Atlantic, Indian, Pacific and Mediterranean oceans. During the twenty-nine
years of operation thirty-four aircraft have been destroyed and 247 lives have
been lost as a result of mishaps [(Hess, 1983), (Borowsky, 1992)] 2 . Despite the
large loss of life the P-3 is considered safe relative to other aircraft in naval
aviation. For the years 1985-1991 the F/A-18 mishap rate per 100,000 flight
hours was 4.23, whereas the P-3 mishap rate was .19 (Borowsky, 1991). Of the
thirty-four P-3 aircraft destroyed, twenty were destroyed while at forward
deployed locations. Figure 1.2 shows that eight of the thirty four mishaps
were known to be caused by mechanical error, twenty-four were in part
caused by aircrew error and two were due to unknown causes (Hess, 1983,
Borowsky 1992).
^Aircraft destroyed were involved in Class A mishaps. OPNAV instruction 3750.6Q
defines a Class A mishap an event where total damage is $1,000,000 or greater; or the aircraft
is destroyed or missing; or a fatality or permanent total disability occurs with direct




Figure 1.2. Causes of P-3 Class A Mishaps 1963-1992
II. P-3 AIRCREW COORDINATION TRAINING
A. TRAINING PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
As authorized by Commander Patrol Wings Pacific, Patrol Squadron
Thirty-One was tasked to provide Aircrew Coordination Training for all P-3
squadrons based at Naval Air Station Moffett Field and Naval Air Station
Barbers Point. Patrol Squadron Thirty-One is the west coast P-3 fleet
replacement training squadron. Under the direction of the command
training specialist, Dr. Henry H. Smith, the squadron first trained its own
group of facilitators. Utilizing the command training specialist plus a cadre
of its own instructor pilots and flight officers, Patrol Squadron Thirty-One
completed seminars at each squadron. The initial seminars were followed by
the training of facilitators from each squadron who then completed the task
of training all twelve combat aircrews.
B. SEMINAR DESIGN
The P-3 Orion Aircrew Coordination Training seminar is designed to be
facilitated by two squadron instructors who guide a combat aircrew through
an eight-hour progression of concepts and ideas relevant to flight safety and
efficient crew coordination (VP-31 ACT Facilitator Guide, 1989). Key to the
success of the program is the concept of allowing each squadron the
opportunity to select its own instructors. Internally selected instructors are
more easily accepted and are more capable of understanding the perspectives
of trainees. Aircrew Coordination Training Instructors utilize a facilitator
guide, instructional guide and flip-chart and video presentations during the
day-long course. Ideally, the setting for the seminar is a relaxed atmosphere
wherein participants wear flight suits instead of uniforms, form a circular
seating arrangement for ease of conversation and are encouraged to offer
their views on the concepts at any point during the seminar. A full eight
hours of discussion is usually required to complete the seminar, including a
working lunch wherein members are encouraged to order out pizza or
sandwiches for the group. The setting for the seminar, ideally, is away from
the squadron so that interruptions are kept to a minimum allowing
crewmembers to focus on the material presented. Critical to the success of the
program is the promise of confidentiality to crewmembers who share
personal information with the group. Incidents that have nearly resulted in
aviation mishaps eventually happen to all crewmembers and provide
valuable material for the seminar. The entire discussion is confidential
among the crew and the facilitators. Only the promise of confidentiality will
allow open and frank discussion of ideas and experiences.
C COURSE ORIGINS AND CONTENT
The field of Cockpit Resources Management, includes a broad base of
knowledge put together over several decades of research and application. A
variety of Cockpit Resources Management programs are being presented
world wide to aircrews of civil and military aircraft. Each program is
different, as the needs of the organization or the mission of the aircraft dictate
the content of the course.
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The P-3 ACT course is a version of the program put together by three Air
Force Reserve pilots. Lt.Col. Biegalski, Lt.Col. Halliday Major Houle and
Major Inzana designed and implemented an ACT course for crews flying the
C-5 transport aircraft (Halliday, Biegalski, Inzana, 1986). The course structure
is guided by the concept that the goal of ACT is to provide the aircrew with
something immediately useful and practical. Videos and taped role plays are
used to demonstrate ACT concepts and to provide feedback. Like the P-3
version of their course, the C-5 course facilitators guide a day-long discussion
in a classroom environment. The link between Air Force ACT and P-3 ACT,
is Dr. Henry H. Smith who modified, tested and implemented a revised
version of the Air Force course. With the support of Patrol Squadron Thirty-
One Commanders Alford, Bozin and Hull, and Dr. Smith integrated ACT
into the VP-31 fleet squadron training program.
The content of the course offered to the aircrews of the United States
Navy P-3 Orions is structured to suit the unique features and mission of the
airplane they fly. There are five main sections to the P-3 aircrew coordination








D. OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF P-3 ACT
Each section included in the P-3 aircrew coordination training course is
designed to achieve specific objectives critical to aircraft safety. The objectives
expand and emphasize concepts participants are familiar with in practice but
lacking in understanding and application. The course material emphasizes
application of the objectives through education, demonstration and role play
activities.
1. Synergy
Synergy occurs when the whole of an aircrews' effort is greater than
the sum of its parts. Synergy occurs when crewmembers work together as a
team. The P-3 Aircrew Coordination Instructor Guide indicates that synergy
will only occur when all share a joint and co-equal sense of responsibility for
the safe completion of a flight. Lack of synergy has been responsible for many
previous aviation mishaps wherein a crewmember fails to volunteer or
accept information necessary to prevent a mishap.
Synergy is difficult to achieve because of conditioning that leads to
withholding information critical of other crewmembers. Information is
withheld because of barriers between crewmembers. For example, in the
military relative rank can create a barrier. Junior ranking personnel are
reluctant to correct the mistakes of senior ranking personnel. Lack of
experience can be intimidating for a recently -trained crewmember.
Inexperienced personnel have failed to offer valid information because they
lacked confidence in their abilities or were intimidated by a senior person
(VP-31 ACT Instructor Guide, 1990).
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For synergy to be achieved all crewmembers must recognize the
responsibility of offering their observations to others. All crewmembers must
be receptive to information offered to them. This requires that barriers to the
transfer of information be sufficiently reduced for information to be
exchanged, no matter what the rank or experience level involved.
Synergy is demonstrated to seminar participants through a general
knowledge quiz. Subsequent to the quiz individual scores are tallied.
Individuals normally score in the range of seven to ten correct scores out of
twenty. The group is then allowed to work together on the quiz. Group
scores tend to significantly exceed the score of any individual. Groups
regularly come up with eighteen to twenty correct answers on the quiz,
demonstrating the effect of synergy.
2. Team Creation/Building
Richard Hackman of Harvard University, developed an aircrew
behavior model titled the Life Cycle of the Crew. The model explains
elements of crew behavior critical to safe flight operations (Hackman, 1989).
During the course of a flight the crew will progress through several phases of
team development. Crews proceed through the phases of team development
with differing degrees of effectiveness. Dr. Hackman identified the following





The team creation phase occurs when members of a flight crew first
meet to discuss a flight. The team creation phase only lasts for five to ten
13
minutes. During this time the flight crew leadership, a Pilot or Flight Officer,
establishes the behavioral norms as related to safety, communication and
cooperation. Hackman observed that the norms established at the initial
briefing usually become fixed for the remainder of the flight.
To effectively emphasize the importance of safety, the initial team
creation phase must establish the expected level of regard for safety.
Crewmembers should be encouraged to avoid unsafe practices and look for
hazardous situations that could affect others. For effective communication to
occur on board the aircraft, barriers to communication must be overcome.
Barriers to communication include: superior/subordinate relationships,
fatigue, distractions, noise, workload, instructor/student relationships and
communication by interphone. Crewmembers should be encouraged to
overcome the barriers to communication when important messages must be
conveyed. The importance of cooperation in the role of mission success
should be established from the outset of the briefing. Cooperation requires
that crewmembers assist others when their work is completed. Safety,
communication and cooperation are key elements in the Life Cycle of the
Crew.
To illustrate concepts defined by Hackman, a video presentation of a
briefing emphasizing the utilization of these concepts is shown to seminar
participants. The video includes a twelve-member P-3 crew conducting an
initial briefing for a surface ship surveillance flight. Following the video
tape, participants are given a hypothetical mission assignment and asked to
conduct their own briefing. After completion of their mission brief,
crewmembers view a video playback to observe their ability to include safety,
14
communication and cooperation as part of a briefing. The next three phases
in the Life Cycle of the Crew are addressed by a discussion with seminar
participants led by the facilitators.
Team building occurs during spare moments before and during
flight. Aircrew who choose to interact during this time are better able to
communicate during the mission phase. Team building communication
addresses events that will affect the crew including: the addition of a new
member, destination billeting, inflight meals and other factors affecting a
crewmember's performance. The team Acting/Execution phase occurs
during flight when crewmembers perform their duties. This is when the
ability of the crew to handle safety and mission related activities is carried out.
The team termination phase occurs after mission completion when
crewmembers recapitulate events. During team termination, crew
coordination successes or failures should be identified and lessons learned
from them.
3. Style of Personality
Personalities of individuals on a crew can affect quality of interaction
among crewmembers. For synergy to exist, crewmembers should have
knowledge of differing styles of personalities. Four distinct styles of
personalities are compiled into a behavior model for the seminar. Distinctive
styles are given names to allow easy association and understanding. The
styles of personality discussed are the driver, analytical, amiable and
expressive. The driver is said to be: industrious, systematic, persistent, detail
oriented, serious, exacting and precise. The analytical person is characterized
as: objective, determined, requiring, independent, pragmatic, efficient and
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decisive. Amiable personalities are: supportive, loyal, friendly, responsive,
dependent, easy going and cooperative. The expressive personality is:
imaginative, out-going, stimulating, enthusiastic, spontaneous, fun-loving
and ambitious.
Facilitators lead the discussion and explain to crewmembers how
personality can affect achievement of synergy. No attempt to modify
personalities is done by the course. Personalities are assumed to be fixed
(Gregorich, Helmreich, Wilhelm, Chidester, 1989). Crewmembers must learn
to adapt to each other to promote synergy. Each personality style can affect
the crew in positive and negative ways. Effective synergy is achieved when a
crew can combine the best attributes of each personality. The discussion of
personalities is intended to promote the awareness of personality as a major
factor in crew interaction and illustrate how crewmembers can adapt to each
other. Through education a crew should be more able to cope with the four
personality groups identified in the seminar.
4. Communication
The third model introduced is the cornerstone of the seminar. The




These concepts are the critical elements in the communication
process that affect a crew's ability to cope with challenging flight scenarios.
When circumstances occur that could result in development of an unsafe
situation, crewmembers should question what is occurring, promote their
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concerns about action taken and seek to resolve conflict. Facilitators explain
the concepts and give practical examples of their utilization.
Questioning, in the context of aircrew coordination training, is an
attitude that all crewmembers should possess. Each crewmember should
always be aware of the current phase of flight and plan of action. By
constantly checking one's actions and cross checking actions of others,
mistakes can be detected early and corrective action taken. Facilitators
encourage junior personnel to cross check actions of more experienced
crewmembers. Senior crewmembers are encouraged not to feel threatened by
a junior crewmember questioning their actions. Questioning requires that
crewmembers learn to doubt the status quo is correct and accept that everyone
is capable of making mistakes.
Promoting is recognition and encouragement for crewmembers to be
assertive when necessary. A group interaction decision-making phenomena,
group think, can cause inferior decisions to be made by the group (Janis, 1972).
To avoid group think behavior, an individual who believes his/her opinion
is correct and that the group is wrong should voice that opinion until a
satisfactory answer is provided. Facilitators explain promoting as a
responsibility inherent in assignment to an aircrew. Crewmembers are not
qualified until they have demonstrated a satisfactory level of competence. A
qualified crewmember is responsible for being assertive and expressing
concerns not addressed by the present course of action. Qualified
crewmembers should not tolerate a situation if they are not satisfied with the
course of action and have not received a satisfactory answer to their concerns.
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Conflict is a desirable element and necessary for optimum crew
coordination. Crewmembers must learn to resist tendencies to avoid conflict
out of respect for rank or experience. Conflict is a natural result of
questioning and promoting. Conflict occurs as crewmembers approach
situations with different values, experience, training, opinions and
personalities. A crew able to effectively utilize conflict can realize benefits.
Ideally, conflict will lead to better problem solving, deeper thinking and a
more effective decision making process.
5. Decision Review
Decision Review is the method used to put synergy into effect.
Decision Review is also known as a Bubba Review. By utilizing a word not
popular in present vernacular, the Bubba review is immediately associated
with the synergy model. A crewmember who identifies an unsafe situation
developing should demand a Bubba Review. During a Bubba Review,
questions causing concern are promoted to other crewmembers. A
crewmember requesting a Bubba Review believes an unsafe situation has
developed. Other crewmembers should attempt to resolve the conflict that
has occurred by reexamining the present course of action. Through
resolution of the conflict the current course of action can be continued or an
alternative implemented.
A bubba review can be demanded at any time by any crewmember. A
bubba review is composed of three questions:
• Sir, what is the decision?
• What are the consequences of the decision?
• Is there a new, alternative, better decision?
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A bubba review causes a more open and complete decision making
process. The completion of the review puts relevant issues in the open and
allows a decision to be made based on issues identified by everyone. Another
Bubba Review benefit is the effect of informing everyone on the aircraft the
current course of action. Seminar participants are encouraged to write the
synergy formula on one side of a note card and the three Bubba Review
questions on the other side. The card should be kept in the individual's
inflight checklist for immediate reference.
E. ACT EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA
The driving force for widespread implementation of ACT and
justification for its continued development is preservation of lives and assets.
The criteria for determining if that goal is occurring are not easily measured.
Number of mishaps per one hundred thousand flight hours, is the most
popular criteria used in assessing effectiveness of Naval Aviation safety. For
the year 1991 the mishap rate for Naval Aviation was 2.91 per 100,000 flight
hours (Borowsky, 1990). Statistically, that number is very low relative to the
number of hours flown. Since mishaps for some aircraft are infrequent
events, measurement of mishaps per hours flown can be greatly affected by
chance. A few chance incidents can greatly affect the mishap rate (Helmreich,
Chidester, Foushee, Gregorich, Wilhelm 1989). A mid air collision of two
aircraft or the crash of a formation flight define a single event that would
skew the mishap rate figure. Only by observing mishap rates over a long
period of years could any distinct trend be determined. Claims of immediate
reductions in mishap rates via ACT may be premature. Since organizations
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cannot continue a program such as ACT for an extended period on a trial
basis, short term measures of program effectiveness are necessary for
justification and further implementation.
To provide more immediate and valid measures of ACT effectiveness,
Helmreich, Foushee, and Wilheim (1989) have developed methods of
assessment that can be applied. Instead of one measure, multiple measures




The implementation of ACT should have observable effects. These
effects are called outcome measures and include incidents where ACT
training prevented a mishap, changes in crew coordination attitudes/abilities
and a favorable response by crew members towards ACT (Helmreich,
Foushee, and Wilheim, 1989). Process measures are actual changes in
execution briefing, preflight, flight and postflight evolution caused by
implementation of ACT procedures. Process measures represent the
implementation of ACT concepts into normal operating procedures.
Moderator factors are composed of human and material resources and
include organizational support and environmental factors that affect
implementation of ACT. The implementation of ACT demands change from
those involved. To overcome the resistance to change inherent in large
organizations, moderator factors must support ACT. Success or failure of an
ACT program can be determined by the moderator factors.
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F. COCKPIT MANAGEMENT ATTITUDES QUESTIONNAIRE
The data set utilized to provide an analytical basis for this report is
derived from the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire [(CMAQ),
(Helmreich, Wilhelm, Gregorich, 1988), (Appendix A)]. Based on a study of
60 aviation mishaps occurring from 1968-1976 (Cooper, Lauber, 1980) five
common errors related to crew coordination were identified including:
• Preoccupation with minor technical problems
• Inadequate leadership
• Failure to delegate tasks and assign responsibilities
• Failure to set priorities
• Failure to communicate intent and plans
The crew coordination attitudes necessary to prevent a reoccurrence of
these failures were determined. The attitudes were compiled into a survey
with a corresponding scale to allow the degree of concurrence of disagreement
expressed by a respondent. The survey was titled The Cockpit Management
Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ). An updated format is widely used for civil
and military analysis of ACT effectiveness (Gregorich, Helmreich, Wilhelm,
1989). Responses to CMAQ survey questions can be analyzed by statistical
methods to determine effects ACT training. The degree of concurrence or
disagreement with survey questions indicates disposition towards attitudes
critical to flight safety.
Trends can be expected in responses to the CMAQ. Organizations whose
aircraft and mission are conducive to ACT implementation score more
favorably to survey responses. For multi-crewed aircraft (P-3), safety and
mission effectiveness are positively correlated to crew coordination ability.
For single piloted aircraft (F-18), the potential benefit of crew coordination is
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less as safety and mission effectiveness are often dependent upon one
individual. This does not imply that pilots of single seat aircraft cannot
benefit from ACT. Often pilots of single seat aircraft work in coordination
with other aircraft and personnel external to their platform. History effects
explain that aircrew members who have long term exposure to ACT respond
differently than those who don't. Exposure to formal and informal training
methods eventually causes increased awareness and acceptance of ACT
(Gregorich, Helmreich, Wilhelm 1990).
The survey was modified for P-3 ACT so that question terminology
would be compatible with P-3 aircrews. For example, instead of referring to
the first pilot and load master the P-3 CMAQ version referred to the Plane
Commander and Flight Engineer. Modification of question terminology was
done so that original concepts remained intact. The P-3 seminar is not
designed to teach directly to the CMAQ survey. Some CMAQ concepts are
directly covered by the P-3 seminar, others are indirectly addressed and some
are not reviewed at all. Only the portion of the survey designed to measure
attitudes, is addressed in this thesis.
The ability to change attitudes is an important measure of the
effectiveness of the P-3 ACT seminar. The CMAQ has been widely used in
aviation training as a valid measure of attitudes affecting crew coordination.
Policy makers can use this CMAQ analysis to guide the future of P-3 ACT.
This thesis contributes to the knowledge necessary to direct the future of P-3
ACT.
The fit of ACT as a valuable part of a much larger aviation safety
program, can be measured by CMAQ results. Failure of P-3 ACT to provide
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useful training would indicate the need for a different approach to imparting
crew coordination knowledge. Success of P-3 ACT would indicate that the
present seminar format is accomplishing the objective of changing attitudes.
An outcome between the two extremes would indicate a need for refining
current efforts.
Crew coordination training programs vary according to the needs of an
organization and its users. Concepts and methods of instruction can be
varied to meet the needs of a group. The P-3's diverse group of crewmembers
presents a challenge in developing a course appropriate for all
crewmembers. Crewmembers differ by aircrew position, P-3 flight hours,
years military, age and other variables. The degree to which the challenge of
diversity is addressed can be measured by the uniformity of CMAQ responses.
If P-3 ACT is designed considering aircrew diversity, CMAQ responses
will be similar across the groups. If P-3 ACT is less effective for particular sub-
groups they will respond differently from the norm. To address
requirements of a group that responds differently to ACT many options exist.
The course could be amended for the entire group. The course could be
amended and taught separately for the group with different responses. Lastly,
ACT could be discontinued for the group responding below the norm.
Ideally, all groups respond the same regardless of their crew position or
military background.
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G. P-3 AIRCREW COORDINATION TRAINING
This thesis does not represent the first research effort into P-3 Aircrew
Coordination Training. John Wilhelm and Robert Helmreich of the
University of Texas at Austin prepared a report as part of the NASA-
University of Texas cooperative inquiry into Cockpit Research Management
Training (Wilhelm, Helmreich, 1990). One aspect of their report, published
in March of 1990, analyzed crewmembers' feelings towards ACT as
determined by responses to the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire
(Helmreich Wilhelm, Gregorich, 1988). Responses to the following questions
and statement were analyzed:
• Overall, how useful did you find the training?
• How important is recurrent training in aircrew coordination?
• ACT has the potential to increase safety and crew effectiveness.
• Will the training change your behavior on the flightdeck?
Response options included:





90 percent of the participants found the course to be "very useful" or
"extremely useful." 80 percent believed recurrent training is "very useful" or
"extremely useful." 86 percent agreed strongly with the statement that "ACT
has the potential to increase safety and crew effectiveness." 67 percent
believed a "moderate" or "large" change in their behavior would occur as a
result of the course. The research also included an analysis of participant
opinions of each module of the course. Overall, all modules were thought to
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be useful by the majority of participants. Acceptance of the usefulness of P-3
ACT was established for both officers and enlisted personnel.
In their report Wilhelm and Helmreich provide a positive answer to the
question; Will crewmembers have favorable feelings towards the concepts
and theory that are the basis for ACT? However, proof that ACT is liked by
those who attend is not proof that positive attitude changes have occurred.
The next step in the analysis and the purpose of this thesis is to determine if
ACT has changed attitudes towards flight safety. Utilizing a section of the
CMAQ separate from that used by Wilhelm and Helmreich, perceived
attitude changes can be measured. Portions of the Cockpit Management
Attitudes Questionnaire are designed to identify the attitude of the person
taking the survey. P-3 ACT seminar participants were asked to complete the
questionnaire before and immediately after the seminar. Changes in before
and after questionnaire responses are indicative of an attitude change. If
attitudes can be changed the course is serving its purpose of creating a more
safe flying environment for the aircrews.
H. ORGANIZATIONAL/INDIVIDUAL REACTION
1. Resistance to Change
Acceptance of the need for change through ACT requires agreement
that past patterns of behavior were less than adequate. P-3 squadrons are
heavily tasked with training and operational requirements and can only
devote limited time to additional training. Their demanding schedule often
requires extended working hours and work on weekends. Participation in
ACT may require a crewmember with years of experience and thousands of
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mishap free flight hours to add to an already busy work schedule. To achieve
ACT goals, resistance to change due to time constraints and other reasons has
to be overcome.
The first step in overcoming resistance, is to identify a clear need for
change. For ACT, the need for change is a need for preservation of lives and
aircraft. This need may not be seen as a high priority for many P-3
crewmembers. The length of P-3 service for the crewmembers surveyed for
this thesis was less than 5 years. During their time of P-3 experience, few
accidents have occurred. The excellent safety record of the P-3 relative to
other Naval aircraft may promote a false sense of security. The ACT program
must first establish with participants the need for change based on past
mishaps that have occurred and the potential of this program to prevent
further mishaps.
The three-step process of crew coordination behavior change requires
unfreezing of the present behavior pattern, moving to a new behavior
pattern and refreezing desired behaviors (Lewin, 1958). The VP-31 course
unfreezes present behavior through education of seminar participants. A
review of P-3 and other crew coordination failures that have lead to mishaps,
illustrates room for improvement. Movement to new behavior patterns is
accomplished via knowledge and skills imparted through facilitators.
Refreezing of desired behavior is accomplished through role play exercises
where ACT skills are utilized by aircrew and then reviewed on video tape.
The participation of senior crewmembers in the role play exercises is key to
the acceptance of ACT concepts by junior personnel. Through their
participation, senior personnel provide support for the legitimacy of the ACT
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concepts. If the three-step change process has been successful new behaviors
will be utilized during subsequent flights.
To achieve the change, someone is required to serve as the change
agent (Sziligy, Wallace, 1987). The change agent should be someone not
bound by tradition, culture or the politics of an organization. This person
must offer new ideas, viewpoints and perspectives. The change agent must
have support from organizational leadership and be able to gain the trust of
those for whom change is required. The change agent for P-3 ACT is Dr.
Henry H. Smith of VP-31. As a civilian working for the Navy, Dr. Smith is
outside the lines of authority affecting crewmembers. He has been involved
in the ACT field of study since 1985. As a retired Navy Captain and an aviator
with thirty plus years of experience, he is knowledgeable about flight
operations and has sufficient status among aircrews to serve as a change agent
for implementing ACT.
Implementation of P-3 ACT has been accomplished with the
awareness that resistance to change is expected. The primary means of
overcoming resistance is the validity and utility of the material to
crewmembers. Change will occur if the material is useful. Also, selection of a
credible change agent has provided the best opportunity for course concepts to
be heard and understood.
2. The Boomerang Effect
Implementation of ACT into military aviation is not universally
supported. For example, a P-3 flight engineer who has accumulated
thousands of P-3 hours may not see a need to integrate new ideas into
present methods of managing a cockpit. A P-3 ordanceman may feel that his
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opportunity to affect safety of flight related scenarios is limited and his
opinion is not necessary or desired by the pilot or flight officer. These and
other aircrew who attend ACT seminars may have negative reactions to the
material presented.
A report on the Negative reaction phenomenon, When Training
Boomerangs (Helmreich, Wilhelm, 1989), identifies a sub-group likely to
have a negative reaction to ACT. The group is distinct not by the experience
level or aircraft flown but by the personality type. Via factor analysis of the
CMAQ, a group of individuals weak in both instrumental and expressive
personality traits were identified. This group was prone to significant
negative reaction to CMAQ communication and coordination related
questions. ACT course concepts emphasize the importance and necessity of
being a vocal and involved member of a crew. For this personality group
these concepts conflict with established behavior patterns.
The strength of negative reaction can be influenced by another factor,
group dynamics. The effect of group dynamics influenced the degree a
seminar was good or bad as seen by participants. A successful ACT seminar
requires an engaged, participative crew focused on the material being
presented. Many outside influences beyond those that the facilitators control
can cause a seminar to fall short of this goal. When a seminar does not
captivate the crew, the weak instrumental and expressive personalities are
much more likely to reject material being presented. ACT can cause attitudes
to shift opposite of the desired direction for a distinct group of individuals.
P-3 ACT Facilitator training identifies the possibility of a negative
reaction occurring. Facilitators are trained to identify aircrew who withdraw
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from discussion or question the course content. Objections to the course
concepts are encouraged to allow discussion among the group. Concepts are
presented with "take it or leave it" option. Some will find ACT more useful
than others. Even those who feel the course is of no use to them, have agreed
that the course is useful to others (Smith, 1992). Boomerang individuals
would be indicated in the CMAQ survey results by a shift in attitudes
opposite from the desired direction.
The boomerang effect and other effects of ACT can be measured by
the CMAQ. How much change has occurred in attitudes of crewmembers
can be determined through analysis of CMAQ data. The P-3 ACT data base is
a resource for measuring attitudes of those who completed the seminar.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. DATA SET
A subset of the CMAQ contains thirty-two questions designed to measure
an individual's attitude towards crew coordination issues. For each of 1,200
seminar participants, the CMAQ was administered just prior to and
immediately after seminar completion. The sample of 1,200 represents
approximately sixty percent of the total population who have completed the
seminar. The data were screened based upon the criteria explained in part B
of this chapter. The data were collected between June of 1988 and August of
1991.
Survey results were tabulated by Dr. John Wilhelm, University of Texas
at Austin, and transferred to the Naval Postgraduate School mainframe
computer. The data set has been modified to allow completion of this
research. Personality measures and narrative comments have been removed
as they are beyond the scope of this report. The data set is now limited to
seventy-one response variables for each seminar participant including:
• Thirty-two preseminar attitude responses
• Thirty-two postseminar attitude responses
• Seven aircrew positional/experience demographic information
variables
B. FILTERING OF DATA
Once the data file was loaded to the mainframe computer several actions
were taken to ensure inaccurate data were filtered out. Data anomalies could
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have occurred when surveys were completed, assembled into a data base or by
other causes. Data were screened to ensure the analysis could utilize
information representative of P-3 aircrews. The following steps were taken
to screen the data:
• The CMAQ allows a response range of one through seven. Only those
responses within this range were considered.
• Observations with missing values in the survey responses were not
considered in the analysis.
• Number of hours with assigned crew was limited to 2000.
• Number of P-3 flight hours was limited to 10,000.
• Maximum age respondents was limited to a maximum of 45.
• Years in military service was limited to a maximum of 25.
Limiting of responses by the above standards is intended to provide a
population sample most representative of P-3 aircrews assigned to squadrons
at the time the surveys were completed. Initially, 1,200 observations were
screened to determine their utility for analysis. After application of the
previously explained measures, the group was narrowed to 573 observations.
The primary reason for exclusion in the analysis is failure to correctly fill out
the survey. CMAQ responses out of the 1-7 allowable range and demographic
data not consistent with reasonable crewmember profiles eliminated some
from inclusion. Seminar facilitators labeled some seminars as particularly
good and others as particularly bad. No effort was made to screen out
seminars based upon the level of success measured by the facilitator's
evaluation. By including both good, bad and average seminars the analysis
should reflect the overall program effects.
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C RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
The survey respondents represent the current pool of personnel the Navy
has assigned operating P-3 aircraft in active duty squadrons. Variation in the
demographic information is caused by organizational factors. All crew have
differences in levels of experience based upon the years in the service and
years of flying duty. Table 4.1 provides data on the respondents grouped by
crew position. For each crew position provided are: hours assigned to crew
(HRSCR), hours of P-3 flying (HRSP3), total flight hours (FLTHR), years of
military service (YRSMIL), and age (AGE).
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TABLE 3.1 DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR PERSONNEL INCLUDED IN CMAQ
ANALYSIS
AVERAGE VALUES BY CREW POSITION
POSITION HRSCR HRSP3 FLTHR YRMIL AGE
PLANE CMDR. 195 1544 2106 8.9 34
SECOND PILOT 242 555 892 5.0 31
THIRD PILOT 97 240 433 3.5 28
FLIGHT ENGR. 316 2416 2579 10.9 29
NAVIGATOR 162 630 829 5.3 29
TACTICAL COORD. 188 1544 1700 7.8 33
SENSOR 1 290 1664 1766 8.1 28
SENSOR 2 150 694 633 4.3 26
SENSOR 3 283 1562 1695 6.1 28
INFLIGHT TECH. 333 1192 1160 6.6 30
ORDINANCE 345 1091 1152 5.8 27
GROUP AVERAGE 244 1360 1562 7.2 30
Source: Data derived from the P-3 CMAQ survey.
D. HYPOTHESIZED ATTITUDE CHANGE MODEL
This report will determine if attitude changes have occurred as measured
by the pre and post seminar CMAQ. Figure 3.1 provides a model of the
process utilized to conduct this analysis. Initial seminar responses indicate
preseminar attitudes towards concepts that make-up each CMAQ question.
Initial predisposition is a result of an individual's knowledge, attitudes and
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skill. Individuals are predisposed to certain attitudes as a result of experiences
in the past. A difference in the responses indicates effects of ACT training on
the respondent. The frequency and significance of changes in responses may
reveal patterns associated with a particular CMAQ questions or a group of
respondents.
POST-SEMINAR PRE-SEMINAR CHANGE
ATTITUDE - ATTITUDE = CAUSED
RESPONSE RESPONSE BY ACT
Figure 3.1 Hypothesized Measure of Attitude Change
ACT seminar discussion is designed to create an increased awareness of
crew coordination issues and promote a self-examination of existing attitude
sets. Desirable and undesirable attitudes are explained by facilitators and
demonstrated in role play activities. ACT is intended to reinforce desirable
attitudes and eliminate undesirable tendencies. Participants who discover in
themselves an undesirable attitude trait have a choice of reactions. The
desirable reaction is for the individual to change his attitude to be more
consistent with effective crew coordination. All phases of the seminar
address attitudes either directly or indirectly through concepts taught. The
seminar is designed to cause change in attitudes where change is necessary.
Immediately following the seminar, before the participants depart, the
CMAQ is re administered. CMAQ responses now become a measure of the
attitude set an individual started the seminar with modified by changes
caused by ACT. This report is focused on identifying changes that have taken
place as a result of ACT.
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E. ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES
1. Hypothesis Tests For Means of Paired Samples
An examination of changes in attitudes as measured by the CMAQ
was conducted to determine changes caused by ACT. Thirty-two preseminar
and postseminar CMAQ responses were compared for the group and for
subgroups of respondents. Analyses included input only from those
respondents not screened out by methods explained earlier in this report. T-
tests applied to preseminar and postseminar responses were used to
determine if changes in attitudes had taken place and if the changes were
statistically significant. T-tests by aircrew position were used to determine if
ACT was more effective for particular subgroups.
Preseminar and postseminar CMAQ scores are paired samples. By
pairing the samples an accurate measurement of seminar effects can be
obtained (Weiss, Hassett, 1991). The difference between the two responses is
the paired difference and is defined as:
• d = X2 - X]
where,
• X2 = postseminar and x\= preseminar response
The null hypothesis for the T-test analysis is that the difference
between paired samples is zero. The alternative hypothesis is that the
difference is greater than or less than zero. A significant change away from
zero in the desired direction, indicates an attitude change has occurred. The
null (H ) and alternative (Ha ) hypotheses are defined as:
• H : /il = pi
• Ha : \i\ > pi or fil < fil
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By evaluating whether a change in response has occurred at the 5
percent significance level, the standard by which an attitude change has
occurred is determined. The t-tests applied were one tailed. The direction of
the desired attitude shift is dependent upon the CMAQ question. Questions
for which a positive shift is desired were right tailed. Questions for which a
negative shift is desired were left tailed. Both tests were done at the 5 percent
significance level as signified by:
• u = .05
For this analysis, the significance level of 5 percent was used to
determine if the null hypothesis was accepted or rejected. Testing at the 5
percent level is a commonly used value although more or less stringent
criteria can be applied. When all participants were analyzed together the
critical value of t is 1.645. For subgroups of twenty-nine or less the critical
value increases. In this thesis group size exceeded twenty-nine for all groups
allowing the same critical value to be used for all t-test analyses. The critical
value is:
• to.05 = 1-645 if n> 29
A hypothesis test can be completed utilizing the mean of the
paired differences, the standard deviation of the paired differences and a sum
of observations utilized. The result of the relationship of these variables is a
test statistic that can be compared against the critical value. If the test statistic
does not exceed the critical value the null hypothesis is accepted. If the test
statistic exceeds the critical value the null hypothesis is rejected. The test






A correlation analysis of changes in survey responses and
demographic data was used to indicate the relationship between these
variables and the responses given. Years of flying and military experience
may correlate with an increased or decreased acceptance ACT concepts.
Correlation analysis can detect any linkage between CMAQ responses and
flight hours, P-3 experience, age and years of military service. The Pearson
product moment correlation coefficient is used to provide the level of
correlation between CMAQ responses and individual characteristics (Weiss,
Hassett, 1991). The value of the correlation coefficient (r) will lie between -1
and 1. Values close to -1 or 1 indicate strong correlation. Values close to zero







• Sxx = 2>2-(2»2 /«
• Sxy = 2>y- (Lx) (£y) / n
• Syy = Iy2 - (Xy)2 / n
Correlation analysis can identify strengths or weaknesses in ACT
training. If certain attributes of entering experience or qualification level
affect ACT outcomes, those attributes will result in exceptional correlation
scores. Correlation analysis should indicate the effectiveness of training for
different sub-groups of participants.
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section describes the results of the analyses undertaken to determine
if attitude changes occurred as a result of ACT for P-3 aircrews. The primary
research objective is to apply statistical analysis techniques to the CMAQ data
base and interpret results. Results for group and sub-groups therein will be
determined.
A. T-TEST ANALYSIS
Before and after seminar survey responses are the focus of this thesis.
Table 4.1 presents analysis results of preseminar and postseminar responses
for the entire group of respondents. Results for sub-groups by aircrew
position are in appendix B (1-11). Differences between responses before and
after the seminar are indicative of attitude changes. For half of the CMAQ
responses (Questions 2,3,4,6,7,8,10,12,14,15,16,20,21,22,23,28) a positive value
shift in survey response is desirable. For other survey responses (Questions
1,5,9,11,13,17,18,19,24,25,26,27,29, 30,31,32) a negative value shift is the desired
outcome. The difference in the desired direction is caused by survey question
wording. Some questions evaluate concurrence with desirable attitudes,
others evaluate level of disagreement with undesirable tendencies. This
analysis will focus on changes in survey responses to evaluate their frequency
and significance. The analysis is conducted for the entire group and for sub-
groups.
T-tests of the difference between the thirty-two preseminar and
postseminar CMAQ responses indicate attitude changes caused by ACT.
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Where the test statistics did not exceed the critical value no change in attitude
was judged to have occurred. When the test statistics exceeded the critical
value an attitude change was judged to have occurred. For each individual
thirty-two possible changes could have occurred on the CMAQ. Based on the
5 percent significance level standard the total number of changes occurring
was determined. Three possible outcomes existed for each CMAQ response:
• An attitude shift in the desired direction
• No attitude change
• An attitude change opposite the desired direction
Table 4.1 provides the combined t-test results for all crew positions
grouped together. The combined t-test is useful for determining the impact of
ACT on the group as a whole. The methodology used to attain the results in
table 4.1 is explained in chapter III section E of this report. The last column in
table 4.1 indicates the probability value and whether or not the value was
significant.
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TABLE 4.1 GROUP CMAQ PRESEMINAR (XI) AND POSTSEMINAR (X2)
SURVEY MEANS, CHANGE, T VALUE AND T-TEST RESULTS
AAQ XI X2 IDEAL ACTUAL T PROBABILITY
MEAN MEAN SHIFT CHANGE VALUE VALUE
1 4.40 3.68 - -.717 11.943 .0001 *
2 5.67 5.95 + .283 5.500 .0001 *
3 5.57 5.96 + .391 7.940 .0001 *
4 4.36 4.30 + -.067 1.001 .3171
5 5.34 4.46 - -.869 10.642 .0001 *
6 6.02 6.27 + .248 6.013 .0001 *
7 6.73 6.76 + .033 1.369 .1716
8 5.58 6.07 + .476 10.417 .0001 *
9 5.82 5.30 - -.519 9.634 .0001 *
10 6.32 6.46 + .136 3.660 .0003 *
11 3.28 2.42 - -.855 10.625 .0001 *
12 5.75 5.96 + .216 4.987 .0001 *
13 4.32 4.41 - .089 1.428 .0001 *
14 5.02 6.03 + 1.016 14.717 .0001 *
15 2.85 2.90 + .065 0.848 .3966
16 5.97 6.38 + .395 8.290 .0001 *
17 4.11 3.83 - -.276 4.568 .0001 *
18 2.18 2.26 - .080 1.392 .1645
19 2.40 2.25 - -.148 2.364 .0184*
20 5.41 6.04 + .640 9.961 .0001 *
21 6.51 6.66 + .150 4.437 .0001 *
22 5.95 6.33 + .377 7.937 .0001 *
23 5.82 6.13 + .317 5.989 .0001 *
24 4.15 3.61 - -.543 7.949 .0001 *
25 5.05 4.87 - -.185 3.167 .0016*
26 4.78 4.57 - -.200 2.752 .0061 *
27 1.90 1.87 - -.035 0.670 .5031
28 6.22 6.48 + .260 5.394 .0001 *
29 2.08 1.72 - -.361 7.101 .0001 *
30 2.48 2.24 - -.240 4.532 .0001 *
31 2.02 1.72 - -.297 5.708 .0001 *
32 1.22 1.24 - .016 0.651 .5154
Source: Data derived from the P-3 CMAQ surveys.
* Indicates desirable attitude change occurred.
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The combined group t-test indicated 25 desirable CMAQ changes out of 32
possible. Utilizing the entire group for the test, provides a much nigher
number of indicated attitude changes as compared to t-tests by sub-group. The
higher number is caused by the combined effect of the group. A slight though
insignificant change in attitude for a sub-group may become a significant
change when all the groups share the same slight change in attitude. 25 out
of 32 desirable shifts in attitude represent a change on 78 percent of the CMAQ
questions.
Table 4.2 provides the T-test results for the entire survey group as
indicated by table 4.1 and for sub-groups by aircrew position. Table 4.2
indicates the number of significant attitude changes occurring out of a total of
thirty-two possible. Significant changes in attitudes for sub-groups were
determined by the same method used in table 4.1 based on the results in
appendix B 1-11.
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TABLE 4.2 BREAKDOWN OF ATTITUDE CHANGES AS INDICATED BY A





























Source: Derived from analysis of P-3 CMAQ data.
The results of t-test analyses as displayed in table 4.2 indicate that in many
cases the null hypothesis that CMAQ scores are the same after the seminar,
can be rejected. The range of significant desirable attitude shifts for all
positions is 7 to 18 for the 32 CMAQ questions. A comparison of attitude















Figure 4.1 Favorable Changes in CMAQ Attitudes
B. INTERPRETATION OF T-TEST ANALYSIS
The CMAQ is an instrument for measuring concurrence with attitudes
conducive to effective crew coordination. The method used to construct the
CMAQ has provided a tool for measuring overall crew coordination
awareness and potential. It was not designed to directly identify particular
strengths or weaknesses in sections of P-3 ACT. The material in P-3 ACT does
not directly address questions on the CMAQ. Within each CMAQ question
are many crew coordination concepts and issues. Question by question
analysis of CMAQ results does not allow a distinct understanding of thirty-
two separate ACT concepts and issues. By looking at the combined CMAQ
change for all thirty-two questions the effect of ACT can be seen. The results
of the P-3 CMAQ have provided the change in CMAQ scores based on
comprehensive change and not a question by question analysis. P-3 CMAQ t-
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test results have resulted in the formation of three distinct groups. The three
sub-groups are identified and explained in the following sections.
1. Sub-group One
Plane Commanders (16), Flight Engineers (16) and Tactical
Coordinators (18) had the highest number of attitude shifts resulting from
ACT training. A Plane Commander is primarily responsible for the safe
completion of a flight. The Tactical Coordinator is responsible for successful
completion of a mission. The flight engineer is responsible to the pilot for
support in flight safety related issues. Successful completion of all three of
these crew assignments is dependent upon effective crew coordination.
These results indicate a positive relationship between responsibility for crew
coordination and the impact of ACT.
2. Sub-group Two
Figure 4.1 indicates a similar level of attitude changes across sensor
station operators, inflight technician and ordnanceman. For this group the
average number of attitude response changes was 11.2 indicating that for over
one third of the CMAQ responses an improvement on safety attitudes was
achieved. During the conduct of a flight these crew positions can occasionally
play a critical safety role during a flight. However, for most flights they are
more likely to play minor role related to safety issues. To this group, ACT
concepts are more likely to reflect a new way of thinking about their roles
because their training places less emphasis on crew coordination and safety.
This subgroup of the P-3 crew is mainly responsible for mission related
aspects. The P-3 ACT course is designed to broaden utility of ACT from flight
station personnel to include the all crewmembers. The number of positive
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shifts occurring in this group supports the ACT principle that crew
coordination is everyone's responsibility.
3. Sub-group Three
Second Pilots, Third Pilots and Navigators represent another
subgroup of attitude shifts as measured by the CMAQ. A commonalty within
this group is the accomplishment of tasks under the immediate direction of
others on board the aircraft. The Second and Third Pilots perform their
assignments under the immediate direction of the Plane Commander. The
Navigator works under the supervision of the Tactical Coordinator. For all
three crew positions, tasks, are to be carried out according to guidelines set by
the Plane Commander or Tactical Coordinator. Crew coordination
development and execution is a lessor role for this group. The lower number
of shifts for Second Pilots, Third Pilots and Navigators as compared to their
senior counterparts, could be reflective of a lessor crew coordination
responsibility and authority.
C CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Identification of subgroups for whom ACT is more or less effective,
would be useful for understanding the effects of ACT. Perhaps ACT is not
effective for sensor station operators who are less involved in safety issues.
Possibly senior personnel will resist the new concepts and revised thinking
that is part of ACT. Previous safety related programs focus on flight station
personnel only whereas ACT has brought in all crew positions. Correlations
were run on demographic variables and the difference scores between pre-
and post- CMAQ responses. These analyses will help support or dispel these
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and other questions regarding ACT and its relationship to demographic
information included in table 3.1.
Correlation responses fall within a -1.00 to 1.00 range. Any value near
these extremes can be evaluated for its implications for seminar design and
teaching. Table 4.3 provides a correlation analysis for change in CMAQ score
and four demographic variables including: hours assigned to crew (HRSCR),
hours of P-3 flying (HRSP3), years of military service (YRMIL) and birth year
(AGE) for the all respondents.
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TABLE 4.3 CORRELATION OF CMAQ CHANGES AND DEMOGRAPHIC
DATA CORRELATION VALUES

































.08 .08 -.02 -.04
.06 -.04 -.04 -.08
-.02 .06 .02 .01
.00 .00 .00 .00
-.01 .04 .07 .06
-.06 -.03 -.03 .00
.00 .00 -.04 .00
-.01 -.05 -.10 -.10
-.01 -.01 -.04 -.05
-.02 -.01 -.02 -.02
-.10 -.06 .04 .07
-.01 -.04 -.04 .00
.02 .00 .03 -.02
.08 -.06 -.03 -.02
.03 -.02 .03 .00
.05 .08 .07 .04
.05 .01 .05 .03
-.01 .04 .03 .00
-.06 .03 .02 .05
.03 -.02 .00 -.01
.10 .07 .07 .00
.06 .01 .01 -.01
-.04 .07 .08 .08
.03 .01 .06 .03
.05 .03 .09 .06
-.01 .04 .00 -.02
.03 .08 .02 .00
-.02 -.06 -.07 .06
-.03 .05 .07 .02
.00 -.08 -.02 -.03
-.07 -.03 .05 .05
.01 -.01 .00 .02
Source: Derived from analysis of P-3 CMAQ data.
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No significant correlation exists between CMAQ response changes and
the demographic variables as displayed in table 4.3. The highest correlation
value in table 4.3 is .10. Even the highest value does not identify any strong
correlation between attitude change and the demographic variables included
in the analysis.
D. INTERPRETATION OF CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The CMAQ was not specifically designed to allow correlation of
individual background data and changes in attitudes. Inability of the CMAQ
to indicate correlation of individual data and changes in CMAQ response
does not mean that another survey instrument could not demonstrate this
relationship. Correlation of hours assigned to crew, P-3 flight hours, years in
the military and age with the relatively small average change in CMAQ
responses results in low correlation values. For all but one of the thirty-two
CMAQ questions the average change in survey response was less than 1.0 for
the group analyzed (table 4. 1). The small range of average change in survey
response offers minimum opportunity for establishing a correlation with
CMAQ score and the demographic variables used in the analysis. Based upon
the change in CMAQ response that did occur, no significant correlation
existed between change in response and individual characteristics.
Correlation analysis indicates CMAQ response is not a function of P-3
flight experience, hours assigned to a crew, years military, and age. Lack of
strong correlation (table 4.3) indicates these variables do not significantly
affect responses to the CMAQ. Attitude changes could not be predicted by an
individual's experience level. Based on the correlation analysis, aircrew of
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different experience levels react similarly to ACT. No experience level group
is reacting significantly better or worse to the seminar. No change in the way
ACT is designed or instructed is needed based upon years in the military, age,
hours on a crew or P-3 flight hours.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. CMAQ T-test Results
P-3 ACT was successful in improving the attitudes of crewmembers
who attended the seminar. The present format of the seminar is creating an
understanding of attitudes necessary for effective crew coordination. Based
on knowledge attained in the seminar, crewmembers are changing their
CMAQ responses. The t-test results do provide evidence that attitudes are
changing. P-3 CMAQ results indicate that movement away from attitudes
that have caused mishaps in the past. Further, movement on CMAQ
responses is substantial and is occurring for all crew positions. Additional
analyses using the same methodology could provide a basis for evaluating the
P-3 seminar relative to other programs.
Some differences existed by crew position in the number of changes
that occurred on the CMAQ (table 4.2). Crewmembers in leadership roles
were most likely change their attitudes as a result of ACT. Those less
involved in managing crew coordination activity were less likely to indicate
an attitude change. The value of ACT seems to be most appreciated by those
who are normally responsible for implementing ACT concepts. Changes
away from desirable crew coordination attitudes are not evident in the CMAQ
analysis.
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2. CMAQ Correlation Results
The existing course content and seminar format are uniformly
effective across aircrew experience levels. The correlation analysis (table 5.2)
fails to identify any anomalies associated with CMAQ response and the
crewmember demographic variables. The seminar does not teach to a
particular experience level group at the expense of others. Hours of P-3 flying,
hours assigned to crew, years in the military and age were not useful in
predicting changes in attitudes. The correlation analysis supports the concept
of bringing in an intact combat aircrew for the seminar.
By attending ACT as a combat crew, a group attitude may be formed
towards crew coordination. The group attitude towards ACT may result from
the combined effects of individual attitudes. The group coordination attitude
is important as the group will encounter challenges together. Knowledge of
an individual member's attitude towards crew coordination can be used to
make the group more effective under challenging flight scenarios. This
analysis supports the present scheduling by complete combat aircrew as
opposed to by aircrew position.
3. Program Effectiveness
P-3 ACT has substantive indications of being an effective program as
measured by outcome, process and moderator criteria. Indicators include:
CMAQ attitude changes, avoidance of a mid-air collision (Smith, 1992) and
continued high-level organizational support. P-3 flight manuals now
include ACT as a critical sub-area for success on the annual flight evaluation.
To be designated as a qualified crewmember, crew coordination proficiency
must be demonstrated. Integration of ACT into flight evaluations is an
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indication of commitment to the program. The substantial dedication of
resources over several years has allowed program development and
implementation. Continued implementation of ACT will eventually allow
the necessary time to evaluate ACT effects on P-3 mishap rates. In time the
benefit of ACT could be put in terms of number of lives and aircraft saved.
B. IMPLICATIONS
The Naval Safety Center has identified crew coordination error as the
number one causal factor in Naval Aviation mishaps. An increase in
effective crew coordination capability creates the potential for reduction of
crew coordination related mishaps. The P-3 ACT course is capable of
improving crew coordination attitudes as measured by the CMAQ.
Eventually a reduction in P-3 crew coordination related mishaps should occur
if attitude changes seen here transfer to behavior changes on the job. An
accurate measure of this reduction can only be made after sufficient time has
taken place to account for the chance element that is present in tracking the
occurrence of mishaps.
C RECOMMENDATIONS
The initial analysis of the P-3 program completed in 1990 by Wilhelm and
Helmreich (Wilhelm, Helmreich, 1990), determined that crewmembers
believed P-3 ACT training was useful. This thesis indicates that in addition
to finding the course useful, crewmembers attitudes are changed in a positive
direction by the course. A follow-on thesis could attempt to determine if crew
coordination concepts are being utilized.
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Use of ACT could be determined by surveying seminar graduates and
requesting them to document situations where ACT was used. The feedback
from aircrew operators would be valuable in documenting the application of
ACT during actual flight operations. Documentation of actual events could
allow the determination of the effectiveness of separate ACT modules. The
follow-on thesis or report could be constructed of case studies that emphasize
the use of ACT during flight operations.
The CMAQ used to analyze the P-3 crewmember responses could be
redesigned or expanded to take into account factors unique to Naval
Aviation. The CMAQ was designed based on the analysis of civilian aviation
incidents. Perhaps a similar study of Naval Aviation mishaps would reveal
crew coordination concepts unique to Naval Aviation. A redesigned CMAQ
based on crew coordination issues most relevant to Naval Aviation could
provide a more useful measure. The present CMAQ is valuable in providing
a standardized measure for the effectiveness of crew coordination training. A
revised CMAQ modified for Naval Aviation could be used as a standard for
crew coordination training.
The CMAQ should be revised so that all questions evaluate concurrence
with desirable attitudes. At present the CMAQ measures concurrence with
desirable crew coordination attitudes (Questions
2,3,4,6,7,8,10,12,14,15,16,20,21,22,23,28) and disagreement with undesirable
attitudes (Questions 1,5,9,11,13,17,18,19,24,25,26,27,29, 30,31,32). Questions
could be restructured so that for all questions a desirable shift in attitude
occurs in the same direction on the survey scale. Analysis and presentation
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of survey data would be more clear if all questions were consistent in
evaluating concurrence with desirable attitudes.
The completion of ACT training brings the program to a transition point.
The one-day seminar format for P-3 ACT has been presented to all Moffett
Field California and Barbers Point Hawaii P-3 squadrons. The decision to
continue or discontinue training must be made. If training is continued the
new content and format must be determined. Reduced benefit may be
realized by attending the same course a second time. A revised version of the
course may need to be developed. A longitudinal study could determine the
durability of the effects of ACT and the present need for continued training.
Options for continued ACT training include the use of simulator and
flight training. Limited flight hours and simulator time make it unlikely that
entire events could be exclusively dedicated to ACT training. A practical way
of including ACT concepts as an integral part of flight and simulator events is
via the evaluators who conduct these events. All P-3 flight crew personnel
are required to pass an annual flight evaluation. The evaluators who conduct
these events could provide the means for further ACT training. For this to
occur, evaluators must first complete a follow-on ACT course that imparts to
them a deeper understanding of ACT principles along with the ability to
evaluate the crew coordination skills of others. The evaluators could then
instruct and evaluate crew coordination as part of every flight or simulator
event.
Aircrew Coordination Training is sponsored within the Navy for the
purposes of achieving a reduced mishap rate. Avoidance of mishaps in part
depends upon effective crew coordination. Effective tactical utilization of the
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P-3 aircraft also demands effective crew coordination. The ability of P-3 ACT
to enhance the tactical ability of a combat aircrew has not been determined. If
ACT equally applies to tactical crew coordination the scope of the course may
be expanded to enhance safety and tactical ability.
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APPENDIX A. P-3 COCKPIT MANAGEMENT ATTITUDES
UT/NASA/Navy 5-89 QUESTIONNAIRE (CMAQ) Page 1
P-3 AIRCREW SURVEY
I. Patrol Crewmember Attitudes
As part of NASA sponsored research, we are collecting data on current
attitudes in military operations. This survey measures your thoughts and
feelings: it is not an assessment of your learning. All data vill remain
strictly confidential! The identification number allows us to relate your
future surveys to this one.
Please answer by writing beside each item the number from the scale
below that best reflects your personal attitude . Note: when we use the words
"crew" or "crew members", we mean everyone on the aircraft unless otherwise
noted.
****«* Scale ******12 3 4 5 6 7
+ + + +- + + +
Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Agree
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
Strict utilization of the chain of command is essential for effective
crew performance.
Aircrew members should feel obligated to mention their own
Esychological stress or physical problems to other aircrew members
eiore or during a mission.
It is important for all crew members to provide constructive
criticism about the procedures and techniques of others.
I am more prone to make minor mistakes during periods of high
workload than I am in routine mission situations.
The PPC is primarily responsible for the safety of each mission.
______
Each crew member should monitor other crew members for signs of
stress or fatigue, and should discuss the situation with the crew
member.
Good communications and crew coordination are as important as
technical proficiency for the safety of flight.
Aircrew members should be aware of and sensitive to the personal
problems of other crew members.
The PPC should take control and fly the aircraft in emergency and
non-standard situations.
The pilot flying the aircraft should verbalize plans for procedures
or maneuvers and should be sure Chat the information is understood
and acknowledged by crew members affected.
Copilots and other crew members should not question the decisions or
actions of the PPC except when these actions threaten the safety of
the flight.
Crew members should alert others to their actual or potential work
overloads.
Even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical flight
maneuvers.
PPC's should encourage copilots, flight engineers, and other crew
members to question procedures during normal flight operations and in
emergencies.
There are no circumstances (except total incapacitation) where the
copilot should assume command of the aircraft.
A debriefing and critique of procedures and decisions after each
mission is an important part of developing and maintaining effective
aircrew coordination.
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UT/NASA/Navy 5-89 Page 2
*******Scale******12 3 4 5 6 7
+ + + +- + + +
Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Agree
Completely Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Completely
My performance Is not adversely affected by working with an
inexperienced or less capable crew member.
Overall, successful mission accomplishment is primarily a function of
the aircraft commander's flying proficiency.
Correcting the procedures and techniques of others should be avoided
since it can lead to tensions between crew members.
Crew members should voice their concerns even If they are contrary to
decisions which have alredy been made.
The pre-mission aircrew briefing is important for safety and for
effective crew management.
Effective crew coordination requires crew members to take into
account the personalities of other crew members.
All crew members should share responsibility for prioritizing
activities in high workload situations.
A truly professional aircrew member can leave personal problems
behind when flying a mission.
My decision making ability is as good in emergencies as in routine
mission situations.
Training seldom interferes with safe and effective mission
accomplishment
.
Leadership of the aircrew team is expected to come solely from the
PPC.
Enlisted crewmembers' questions and suggestions should be considered
by the flight deck.
When Joining a crew for the first time, a new crew member should not
offer suggestions or opinions unless asked.
It is better to let someone do their Job the way they are used to
rather than offering what you believe to be a better solution.
Because flight engineers have no pilot training, they should limit
their attention to airplane systems.
PPCs who accept and implement suggestions from the crew are lessening
their stature and reducing their authority.
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APPENDIX B-l. T-TEST RESULTS FOR CMAQ RESPONSES
TABLE B-l. PLANE COMMANDER T-TEST RESULTS
Variable N Mean Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 96 -0.813 0.138 -5.906 0.0001
QDIFF2 96 0.292 0.099 2.939 0.0041
QDIFF3 96 0.271 0.120 2.260 0.0261
QDIFF4 96 -0.083 0.142 -0.588 0.5581
QDIFF5 95 -1.147 0.183 -6.261 0.0001
QDIFF6 96 0.219 0.093 2.359 0.0204
QDIFF7 96 0.042 0.051 0.815 0.4171
QDIFF8 96 0.354 0.104 3.417 0.0009
QDIFF9 96 -0.573 0.137 -4.178 0.0001
QDIFF10 96 0.125 0.080 1.561 0.1219
QDIFF11 96 -0.573 0.163 -3.506 0.0007
QDIFF12 96 0.167 0.086 1.940 0.0554
QDIFF13 96 -0.073 0.155 -0.471 0.6387
QDIFF14 95 0.863 0.133 6.505 0.0001
QDIFF15 95 0.105 0.167 0.630 0.5299
QDIFF16 95 0.400 0.123 3.256 0.0016
QDIFF17 96 -0.385 0.160 -2.413 0.0178
QDIFF18 96 -0.010 0.109 -0.095 0.9243
QDIFF19 96 -0.063 0.109 -0.575 0.5664
QDIFF20 96 0.708 0.125 5.680 0.0001
QDIFF21 96 0.115 0.089 1.292 0.1995
QDIFF22 96 0.156 0.110 1.419 0.1593
QDIFF23 96 0.458 0.126 3.625 0.0005
QDIFF24 96 -0.396 0.151 -2.628 0.0100
QDIFF25 96 -0.021 0.132 -0.158 0.8746
QDIFF26 95 -0.053 , 0.173 -0.305 0.7614
0DIFF27 96 -0.052 0.103 -0.506 0.6142
QDIFF28 96 0.083 0.090 0.929 0.3551
QDIFF29 96 -0.281 0.135 -2.088 0.0394
QDIFF30 96 -0.125 0.114 -1.097 0.2756
QDIFF31 96 -0.094 0.099 -0.943 0.3481
QDIFF32 96 0.115 0.059 1.942 0.0551
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TABLE B-2. SECOND PILOT T-TEST RESULTS
Variable N Mean
P0SIT=2
Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 23 -0.870 0.363 -2.397 0.0255
QDIFF2 23 0.174 0.279 0.624 0.5390
QDIFF3 23 0.522 0.266 1.963 0.0624
QDIFF4 23 0.522 0.258 2.021 0.0557
QDIFF5 23 -0.435 0.506 -0.859 0.3996
QDIFF6 23 0.304 0.171 1.775 0.0897
QDIFF7 23 0.000 0.089 0.000 1 .0000
QDIFF8 23 0.348 0.195 1.785 0.0881
QDIFF9 23 -0.565 0.287 -1 .970 0.0616
QDIFF10 22 -0.136 0.119 -1.142 0.2664
QDIFF11 23 0.087 0.503 0.173 0.8642
QDIFF12 23 0.478 0.226 2.121 0.0455
QDIFF13 23 0.304 0.347 0.877 0.3897
QDIFF14 22 1.182 0.346 3.417 0.0026
QDIFF15 22 0.045 0.392 0.116 0.9088
QDIFF16 22 0.136 0.136 1.000 0.3287
QDIFF17 23 -0.478 0.349 -1 .369 0.1848
QDIFF18 23 0.261 0.191 1 .367 0.1855
QDIFF19 23 0.130 0.334 0.390 0.7003
QDIFF20 22 0.727 0.349 2.082 0.0497
QDIFF21 23 0.130 0.114 1.141 0.2660
QDIFF22 23 0.130 0.170 0.768 0.4509
QDIFF23 23 0.391 0.224 1.744 0.0951
QDIFF24 23 -0.783 0.259 -3.023 0.0063
QDIFF25 23 -0.348 0.324 -1.073 0.2951
QDIFF26 22 -0.727 0.256 -2.837 0.0099
QDIFF27 23 -0.304 0.284 -1.071 0.2958
QDIFF28 23 0.000 0.126 0.000 1.0000
QDIFF29 23 -0.304 0.255 -1.194 0.2451
QDIFF30 23 -0.130 0.211 -0.617 0.5435
QDIFF31 23 -0.043 0.172 -0.253 0.8027
QDIFF32 23 0.043 0.076 0.569 0.5753
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TABLE B-3. THIRD PILOT T-TEST RESULTS
P0SIT=3
Variable N Mean Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 34 -1.000 0.223 -4.476 0.0001
QDIFF2 34 0.176 0.107 1.643 0.1098
QDIFF3 34 0.441 0.175 2.520 0.0167
QDIFF4 34 -0.176 0.225 -0.783 0.4390
QDIFF5 34 -0.971 0.314 -3.086 0.0041
QDIFF6 34 0.265 0.195 1.358 0.1836
QDIFF7 34 -0.118 0.092 -1.277 0.2107
QDIFF8 33 0.182 0.171 1.063 0.2959
QDIFF9 34 -0.882 0.188 -4.701 0.0001
QDIFF10 34 -0.029 0.161 -0.183 0.8559
QDIFF11 34 -0.735 0.314 -2.342 0.0254
QDIFF12 34 0.206 0.157 1.314 0.1980
QDIFF13 34 -0.029 0.237 -0.124 0.9019
QDIFF14 32 0.906 0.285 3.177 0.0034
QDIFF15 32 0.219 0.268 0.815 0.4213
QDIFF16 32 0.281 0.197 1.428 0.1632
QDIFF17 34 -0.500 0.265 -1.890 0.0675
QDIFF18 34 -0.059 0.286 -0.206 0.8384
QDIFF19 34 0.176 0.221 0.797 0.4309
QDIFF20 34 0.118 0.270 0.436 0.6654
QDIFF21 34 -0.029 0.099 -0.297 0.7680
QDIFF22 34 0.265 0.154 1.719 0.0951
QDIFF23 34 0.412 0.257 1.601 0.1189
QDIFF24 34 -0.471 0.268 -1.757 0.0882
QDIFF25 34 -0.353 0.289 -1.221 0.2308
QDIFF26 33 -0.364 0.225 -1.614 0.1165
QDIFF27 34 0.059 0.215 0.274 0.7861
QDIFF28 33 0.303 0.119 2.545 0.0159
QDIFF29 34 -0.353 0.179 -1.977 0.0565
QDIFF30 34 0.029 0.143 0.206 0.8384
QDIFF31 34 -0.206 0.125 -1.646 0.1093
QDIFF32 34 -0.029 0.067 -0.442 0.6615
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TABLE B-4. FLIGHT ENGINEER T-TEST RESULTS
P0SIT=4
Variable N Mean Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 63 -0.444 0.182 -2.440 0.0175
QDIFF2 63 0.048 0.162 0.293 0.7702
QDIFF3 63 0.349 0.150 2.322 0.0235
QDIFF4 63 -0.254 0.235 -1.080 0.2843
QDIFF5 63 -0.762 0.269 -2.828 0.0063
QDIFF6 63 0.032 0.104 0.306 0.7603
QDIFF7 63 0.016 0.089 0.178 0.8591
QDIFF8 63 0.317 0.126 2.527 0.0141
QDIFF9 63 -0.603 0.144 -4.187 0.0001




QDIFF12 63 0.238 0.127 1.868 0.0664
QDIFF13 63 0.460 0.184 2.507 0.0148
QDIFF14 61 0.672 0.237 2.837 0.0062
QDIFF15 61 0.213 0.197 1.081 0.2840
QDIFF16 61 0.426 0.116 3.687 0.0005
QDIFF17 63 -0.032 0.207 -0.153 0.8788
QDIFF18 63 0.333 0.223 1.496 0.1398
QDIFF19 63 -0.063 0.207 -0.306 0.7603
QDIFF20 63 0.587 0.199 2.946 0.0045
QDIFF21 63 0.317 0.110 2.874 0.0055
QDIFF22 63 0.413 0.129 3.193 0.0022
QDIFF23 63 0.571 0.176 3.241 0.0019
QDIFF24 63 -0.397 0.189 -2.103 0.0395
QDIFF25 63 -0.206 0.162 -1.275 0.2071
QDIFF26 63 0.048 0.255 0.186 0.8527
QDIFF27 63 -0.032 0.122 -0.261 0.7952
QDIFF28 63 0.397 0.162 2.443 0.0174
QDIFF29 63 -0.079 0.107 -0.743 0.4605
QDIFF30 63 -0.413 0.139 -2.973 0.0042
QDIFF31 63 -0.206 0.107 -1.937 0.0573
QDIFF32 63 -0.032 0.068 -0.468 0.6411
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TABLE B-5. NAVIGATOR T-TEST RESULTS
• P0SIT=5
Variable N Mean Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 33 -0.515 0.302 -1.706 0.0976
QDIFF2 33 0.242 0.261 0.928 0.3603
QDIFF3 33 0.515 0.218 2.362 0.0244
QDIFF4 33 -0.394 0.265 -1.489 0.1462
QDIFF5 33 -0.758 0.292 -2.594 0.0142
QDIFF6 33 0.727 0.227 3.200 0.0031
QDIFF7 33 0.000 0.138 0.000 1 .0000
QDIFF8 33 0.394 0.179 2.199 0.0352
QDIFF9 33 -0.576 0.246 -2.338 0.0258
QDIFF10 33 0.333 0.198 1.685 0.1017
QDIFF11 33 -0.636 0.245 -2.592 0.0143
QDIFF12 33 0.515 0.175 2.948 0.0059
QDIFF13 33 0.455 0.279 1.629 0.1130
QDIFF14 32 1.438 0.269 5.340 0.0001
QDIFF15 32 -0.031 0.349 -0.089 0.9293
QDIFF16 32 0.250 0.238 1.052 0.3008
QDIFF17 33 -0.364 0.199 -1.831 0.0764
QDIFF18 33 0.364 0.194 1.877 0.0697
QDIFF19 33 -0.545 0.185 -2.947 0.0059
QDIFF20 33 0.970 0.211 4.598 0.0001
QDIFF21 33 0.152 0.138 1.094 0.2820
QDIFF22 33 0.576 0.180 3.206 0.0030
QDIFF23 33 0.455 0.200 2.274 0.0298
QDIFF24 33 -0.273 0.239 -1.139 0.2632
QDIFF25 33 -0.091 0.262 -0.346 0.7313
QDIFF26 33 -0.424 0.282 -1.504 0.1425
QDIFF27 33 0.182 0.119 1.530 0.1358
QDIFF28 33 0.182 0.160 1.139 0.2632
QDIFF29 33 -0.333 0.193 -1.727 0.0938
QDIFF30 33 -0.182 0.119 -1.530 0.1358
QDIFF31 33 -0.576 0.238 -2.414 0.0217
QDIFF32 33 0.091 0.110 0.828 0.4138
62
TABLE B-6. TACTICAL COORDINATOR T-TEST RESULTS
P0SIT=6
Variable N Mean Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 66 -1.076 0.166 -6.469 0.0001
QDIFF2 66 0.121 0.137 0.882 0.3810
QDIFF3 66 0.591 0.146 4.036 0.0001
QDIFF4 66 0.030 0.208 0.146 0.8847
QDIFF5 66 -0.788 0.261 -3.015 0.0037
QDIFF6 66 0.333 0.115 2.900 0.0051
QDIFF7 66 0.030 0.081 0.375 0.7085
QDIFF8 66 0.500 0.117 4.282 0.0001
QDIFF9 66 -0.697 0.153 -4.566 0.0001
QDIFF10 66 0.364 0.139 2.610 0.0112
QDIFF11 66 -0.773 0.206 -3.756 0.0004
QDIFF12 66 0.273 0.125 2.181 0.0328
QDIFF13 66 0.303 0.189 1.600 0.1145
QDIFF14 64 1.141 0.215 5.314 0.0001
QDIFF15 64 -0.391 0.215 -1.813 0.0746
QDIFF16 65 0.308 0.095 3.226 0.0020
QDIFF17 66 -0.273 0.147 -1.851 0.0687
QDIFF18 66 -0.106 0.132 -0.806 0.4231
QDIFF19 66 0.061 0.158 0.382 0.7034
QDIFF20 66 0.939 0.210 4.467 0.0001
QDIFF21 66 -0.030 0.103 -0.293 0.7706
QDIFF22 66 0.258 0.139 1.856 0.0680
QDIFF23 66 0.303 0.205 1.480 0.1438
QDIFF24 66 -0.773 0.208 -3.715 0.0004
QDIFF25 65 -0.446 0.177 -2.523 0.0141
QDIFF26 65 -0.169 0.210 -0.807 0.4229
QDIFF27 66 0.030 0.099 0.306 0.7602
QDIFF28 66 0.303 0.114 2.654 0.0100
QDIFF29 66 -0.439 0.143 -3.063 0.0032
QDIFF30 65 -0.446 0.150 -2.967 0.0042
QDIFF31 66 -0.576 0.160 -3.594 0.0006
QDIFF32 66 -0.061 0.091 -0.664 0.5091
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TABLE B-7. SENSOR ONE T-TEST RESULTS
Variable N Mean
P0SIT=7
Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 60 -0.467 0.200 -2.339 0.0228
QDIFF2 60 0.267 0.176 1.515 0.1352
QDIFF3 60 0.400 0.153 2.622 0.0111
QDIFF4 59 -0.169 0.222 -0.764 0.4478
QDIFF5 60 -0.917 0.244 -3.758 0.0004
QDIFF6 60 0.233 0.139 1.675 0.0993
QDIFF7 60 0.050 0.069 0.725 0.4715
QDIFF8 60 0.417 0.129 3.239 0.0020
QDIFF9 60 -0.617 0.158 -3.907 0.0002
QDIFF10 60 0.200 0.106 1.891 0.0635
QDIFF11 60 -1.083 0.273 -3.963 0.0002
QDIFF12 60 0.150 0.164 0.913 0.3652
QDIFF13 60 -0.017 0.191 -0.087 0.9307
QDIFF14 58 0.931 0.229 4.062 0.0002
QDIFF15 58 0.328 0.288 1.136 0.2606
QDIFF16 58 0.569 0.183 3.116 0.0029
QDIFF17 60 -0.100 0.148 -0.676 0.5015
QDIFF18 60 0.200 0.163 1.230 0.2236
QDIFF19 60 -0.117 0.254 -0.460 0.6475
QDIFF20 60 0.417 0.221 1.887 0.0641
QDIFF21 60 0.167 0.109 1.524 0.1328
QDIFF22 60 0.300 0.151 1 .988 0.0514
QDIFF23 60 0.167 0.149 1.120 0.2671
QDIFF24 60 -0.500 0.205 -2.437 0.0178
QDIFF25 60 0.017 0.188 0.089 0.9296
QDIFF26 60 -0.133 0.224 -0.596 0.5532
QDIFF27 60 0.183 0.188 0.976 0.3332
QDIFF28 59 0.186 0.158 1.183 0.2415
QDIFF29 60 -0.333 0.177 -1.880 0.0651
QDIFF30 60 -0.133 0.188 -0.710 0.4807
QDIFF31 60 -0.233 0.178 -1.308 0.1961
QDIFF32 60 -0.017 0.061 -0.275 0.7841
64
TABLE B-8. SENSOR TWO T-TEST RESULTS
Variable N Mean
• P0SIT=8
Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 25 -0.680 0.309 -2.198 0.0379
QDIFF2 25 0.440 0.265 1.660 0.1099
QDIFF3 25 0.200 0.216 0.926 0.3638
QDIFF4 25 0.400 0.306 1.309 0.2028
QDIFF5 25 -0.960 0.381 -2.522 0.0187
QDIFF6 25 0.480 0.209 2.295 0.0308
QDIFF7 25 0.080 0.080 1.000 0.3273
QDIFF8 25 0.440 0.327 1.346 0.1910
QDIFF9 24 -0.500 0.376 -1.330 0.1965
QDIFF10 25 0.520 0.239 2.177 0.0396
QDIFF11 25 -1 .080 0.404 -2.674 0.0133
QDIFF12 25 -0.240 0.273 -0.881 0.3872
QDIFF13 25 -0.640 0.336 -1.904 0.0689
QDIFF14 23 1.043 0.277 3.761 0.0011
QDIFF15 23 0.174 0.411 0.424 0.6760
QDIFF16 23 0.391 0.306 1.277 0.2148
QDIFF17 25 -0.320 0.269 -1.189 0.2460
QDIFF18 25 0.240 0.348 0.690 0.4967
QDIFF19 25 -0.640 0.282 -2.268 0.0326
QDIFF20 25 0.720 0.286 2.518 0.0189
QDIFF21 25 0.080 0.114 0.700 0.4907
QDIFF22 25 0.600 0.337 1.782 0.0874
QDIFF23 25 0.160 0.229 0.700 0.4907
QDIFF24 25 -0.720 0.354 -2.036 0.0529
QDIFF25 25 -0.440 0.300 -1.464 0.1560
QDIFF26 25 -0.040 0.372 -0.108 0.9152
QDIFF27 25 -0.320 0.269 -1.189 0.2460
QDIFF28 24 0.000 0.190 0.000 1.0000
QDIFF29 25 -0.080 0.258 -0.310 0.7589
QDIFF30 25 0.280 0.363 0.771 0.4480
QDIFF31 25 -0.400 0.163 -2.449 0.0220
QDIFF32 25 -0.120 0.133 -0.901 0.3765
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TABLE B-9. SENSOR THREE T-TEST RESULTS
• P0SIT=9
Variable N Mean Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 56 -0.661 0.179 -3.694 0.0005
QDIFF2 56 0.143 0.143 1.000 0.3217
QDIFF3 56 0.107 0.136 0.785 0.4357
QDIFF4 56 -0.125 0.191 -0.655 0.5151
QDIFF5 56 -0.518 0.291 -1 .782 0.0802
QDIFF6 56 0.125 0.111 1.124 0.2661
QDIFF7 56 0.125 0.085 1.475 0.1460
QDIFF8 56 0.518 0.119 4.334 0.0001
QDIFF9 56 -0.482 0.180 -2.676 0.0098
QDIFF10 56 0.196 0.112 1.749 0.0858
QDIFF11 56 -1.339 0.255 -5.248 0.0001
QDIFF12 56 0.232 0.146 1.586 0.1185
QDIFF13 56 0.232 0.213 1.089 0.2809
QDIFF14 54 1.241 0.215 5.780 0.0001
QDIFF15 54 0.111 0.26 0.428 0.6707
QDIFF16 54 0.389 0.148 2.625 0.0113
QDIFF17 56 -0.357 0.191 -1.866 0.0674
QDIFF18 56 -0.107 0.168 -0.636 0.5273
QDIFF19 56 -0.018 0.201 -0.089 0.9297
QDIFF20 56 0.518 0.213 2.429 0.0184
QDIFF21 56 0.179 0.092 1.936 0.0581
QDIFF22 56 0.554 0.169 3.278 0.0018
QDIFF23 55 0.309 0.158 1.962 0.0550
QDIFF24 56 -0.661 0.214 -3.093 0.0031
QDIFF25 56 -0.054 0.177 -0.302 0.7637
QDIFF26 55 -0.309 0.223 -1.386 0.1715
QDIFF27 56 -0.036 0.238 -0.150 0.8811
QDIFF28 56 0.232 0.210 1.105 0.2740
QDIFF29 56 -0.411 0.144 -2.859 0.0060
QDIFF30 56 -0.268 0.209 -1.280 0.2061
QDIFF31 56 -0.161 0.157 -1.026 0.3093
QDIFF32 56 0.036 0.102 0.351 0.7271
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TABLE B-10. INFLIGHT TECHNICIAN T-TEST RESULTS
Variable N Mean
P0SIT=10
Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 40 -0.375 0.205 -1.832 0.0746
QDIFF2 40 0.675 0.225 3.004 0.0046
QDIFF3 40 0.500 0.152 3.291 0.0021
QDIFF4 40 -0.450 0.253 -1.778 0.0832
QDIFF5 40 -1.000 0.275 -3.636 0.0008
QDIFF6 40 0.275 0.160 1.718 0.0937
QDIFF7 40 0.125 0.082 1.533 0.1334
QDIFF8 40 0.725 0.183 3.972 0.0003
QDIFF9 40 -0.425 0.143 -2.978 0.0050
QDIFF10 40 0.000 0.062 0.000 1.0000
QDIFF11 40 -1.400 0.253 -5.541 0.0001
QDIFF12 40 0.450 0.152 2.966 0.0051
QDIFF13 40 -0.050 0.193 -0.260 0.7966
QDIFF14 37 1.027 0.304 3.380 0.0018
QDIFF15 37 0.270 0.341 0.792 0.4338
QDIFF16 37 0.432 0.207 2.089 0.0438
QDIFF17 40 -0.175 0.202 -0.866 0.3920
QDIFF18 40 -0.025 0.216 -0.116 0.9086
QDIFF19 40 -0.325 0.249 -1.305 0.1996
QDIFF20 40 0.400 0.267 1.496 0.1428
QDIFF21 40 0.375 0.181 2.066 0.0455
QDIFF22 40 0.525 0.193 2.723 0.0096
QDIFF23 39 0.231 0.193 1.199 0.2381
QDIFF24 40 -0.175 0.211 -0.827 0.4130
QDIFF25 40 -0.025 0.201 -0.124 0.9016
QDIFF26 38 -0.105 0.304 -0.347 0.7308
QDIFF27 40 -0.225 0.222 -1 .013 0.3173
QDIFF28 40 0.125 0.125 1.000 0.3235
QDIFF29 40 -0.750 0.174 -4.298 0.0001
QDIFF30 40 -0.575 0.196 -2.937 0.0055
QDIFF31 40 -0.375 0.228 -1.642 0.1087
QDIFF32 40 0.150 0.057 2.623 0.0124
/
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TABLE B-ll. ORDNANCE T-TEST RESULTS
• P0SIT=11
Variable N Mean Std Error T Prob>|T|
QDIFF1 37 -0.946 0.245 -3.862 0.0004
QDIFF2 37 0.622 0.224 2.778 0.0086
QDIFF3 37 0.568 0.244 2.329 0.0256
QDIFF4 36 -0.056 0.316 -0.176 0.8615
QDIFF5 37 -1.216 0.320 -3.802 0.0005
QDIFF6 37 0.081 0.206 0.393 0.6968
QDIFF7 36 -0.083 0.083 -1.000 0.3242
QDIFF8 37 0.784 0.266 2.946 0.0056
QDIFF9 37 0.000 0.164 0.000 1.0000
QDIFF10 37 -0.027 0.137 -0.197 0.8446
QDIFF11 37 -1.243 0.441 -2.820 0.0078
QDIFF12 37 -0.027 0.147 -0.183 0.8556
QDIFF13 37 -0.216 0.174 -1.244 0.2217
QDIFF1** 36 1.306 0.245 5.329 0.0001
QDIFF15 36 -0.472 0.327 -1.443 0.1580
QDIFF16 36 0.722 0.176 4.093 0.0002
QDIFF17 37 -0.216 0.260 -0.831 0.4117
QDIFF18 37 0.108 0.238 0.454 0.6526
QDIFF19 37 -0.324 0.280 -1.160 0.2537
QDIFF20 37 0.919 0.220 4.168 0.0002
QDIFF21 37 0.243 0.131 1.859 0.0713
QDIFF22 37 0.486 0.143 3.402 0.0017
QDIFF23 37 0.081 0.136 0.595 0.5557
QDIFF24 37 -0.432 0.291 -1.484 0.1465
QDIFF25 37 -0.297 0.208 -1.428 0.1619
QDIFF26 37 -0.162 0.289 -0.562 0.5778
QDIFF27 37 -0.378 0.230 -1.642 0.1092
QDIFF28 37 0.730 0.231 3.154 0.0032
QDIFF29 37 -0.378 0.252 -1.500 0.1422
QDIFF30 37 -0.324 0.271 -1.195 0.2399
QDIFF31 37 -0.432 0.321 -1.348 0.1861
QDIFF32 37 -0.054 0.116 -0.466 0.6437
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